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Abstract
Purpose: With rapid economic growth and the world’s 
largest population, China has been on the path of pension 
reforms under unparalleled economic transition and 
demographic change since its first formal pension scheme 
established in 1951. This thesis aims to review China’s 
pension systems in three periods, 1951-1984, 1984-
2000, and 2000-2010, with the research question on 
whether Chinese government’s efforts on pension reforms 
conformed to economic and demographic changes within 
each period.
Methodology and Approach:  This paper is a 
literature- and evidence-based research, focusing on 
analyzing economic transitions, demographic changes 
and government reforms on pension systems from a 
historical perspective. Data are collected mainly from 
China’s official statistical yearbooks and international 
organizations’ reports, and are processed into supportive 
graphs. 
Findings: China’s government-led public pension 
reforms from a purely pay-as-you-go (PAYG) based and 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) backed system to the 
multi-tires system were motivated by emerging economic 
reforms and demographic changes. However, despite 
some amendments were introduced under evolving 
economic and demographic circumstances and had made 
some achievements, the pension reform is incomplete to 
solve all the challenges. 
Key words: Pension reform; China 1951-2010; 
Economic reform; Demographic change 
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INTRODUCTION
China has made tremendous economic achievements 
since its transformation from a centrally planned economy 
in Mao’s era (1949-1978) towards a socialist market 
economy (1978- ) through economic reforms. However, 
over the past three decades, rapid economic liberalization 
and marketization within a rigid political structure have 
created challenges for Chinese society especially the 
social security system in general (Saunders & Shang, 
2001). With the largest population, China is also facing 
rapid fertility decline and population ageing. In order 
to adjust to fundamental economic and social changes, 
Chinese government has introduced a series of reforms 
on social security system. As part of the social security 
system, pension is key to enhance the well-being of 
current and future retirees and becoming a heated topic 
in present China under the risk of “growing old before 
getting rich”. 
Government efforts on public pension reforms have 
been ongoing in the last several decades. The first formal 
national pension system was established in the early 
1950s. When China’s economy became market oriented 
since 1980s, the reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
along with demographic pressures imposed financial 
burden on pension provision and led to the shrinking 
coverage of previous SOE-backed, urban-based pension 
system. A series of policy were announced during 1980s 
and 1990s. In 1997, China replaced the pure pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) pension scheme with a three-pillar pension 
system, which includes a defined benefit PAYG (pillar 
Ⅰ), a funded contribution individual account (pillar Ⅱ) 
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and a voluntary social insurance (pillar Ⅲ). Although a 
series of government reforms have helped to gradually 
strengthen the pension system, problems still remain 
under fundamental transitions in Chinese economy and 
population.
Literatures and empirical studies demonstrate that 
social security provisions are government responses 
to fundamental  changes in economic and social 
circumstances (Diamond, 2002; Feldstein & Siebert, 
2009; Park, 2011). China has achieved remarkable GDP 
growth with an average of 9% from 1980 to 2012, during 
which China also experienced rapid population growth, 
rural-urban migration and population ageing (World Bank, 
2013). Under such contexts, this thesis will explore how 
economic and demographic transitions shaped Chinese 
pension systems. Unlike most previous researches that 
solely focus on demographic factors, this thesis will 
comprehensively review the history of pension reforms 
under diverse economic and demographic changes in 
different stages.  
This thesis unfolds as follows: Chapter 1 contains 
literature reviews on pension systems and pension 
reforms. Chapter2 introduces the methodology approaches 
and data resources. Based on a brief review on China’s 
economic history and demographic transition since 1950s, 
Chapter 3 will discuss how economic and demographic 
transitions affected the pension reforms in chronological 
order: 1950-1984 pre-reform period, 1984-2000 reform 
period, and 2000-2010 period. Chapter 4 will provide 
supplementary explanation from political perspective and 
finally a conclusion will be given in Chapter 5. 
1.  LITERATURE REVIEWS ON PENSION 
SYSTEM AND PENSION REFORM 
1.1  Objectives of Pension System 
At a broad level, the term “pension” normally refers to a 
periodical sum of cash received by individuals after their 
retirement (Park, 2011). Pension system is designed to 
provide income for a group of people who have reached 
a certain age and can no longer earn stable income from 
employment, while seeking to increase social security in 
a manner applicable to the specific country (Holzmann, 
2005). 
Targeting on maintaining the well-being of people in 
old age, pension is an important part of social protection 
policy. Skocpol and Amenta (1986) resonated literatures 
by diverse schools of thoughts and concluded the 
determinants of social policy: the structural-functionalist 
school interprets the underlying logic of social policy 
development is industrialization, while the neo-Marxist 
school argues that social policy follows the social 
reproduction requirements for advanced capitalism. As for 
developing countries especially countries in transition like 
China, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) further demonstrate 
that the evolution of social protection policy is determined 
not only by the industrialization or political demands, but 
also by country-specific structural change and different 
market institutions. 
Traditionally the objective of pension is providing 
monetary income to maintain pre-retirement standards of 
living for retirees. Pension systems in general have four 
central objectives from both individual’s and public policy 
perspectives (Barr, 2002):
● For individuals, the primary function of the pension 
system is to facilitate consumption smoothing (transfer earnings 
and resources working period to retirement) and to provide 
supplementary insurance particularly against inflation and illness 
to minimize the risk of uncertainty after retirement. 
● For public policy, the minimum objective of pension 
system is to alleviate poverty of people in old age and 
redistribute a bundle of goods and services to people in need. 
However, considering the different social and economic contexts 
in different countries, the objectives of pension systems need to 
be reassessed (Holzmann, 2005). 
Except goals for individual welfare and public policy, 
pension reforms are also motivated by the concerns 
regarding the potentially consequences for labor market 
incentives (Fisher & Keuschnigg, 2008). Pension system 
is strongly linked to economic development broadly 
and economic growth specifically, and the potential 
implications of public pensions have always played an 
important role in the debate of pension economics in 
literatures. Badly designed pensions which ignore the 
changes in employment structure, demographic factors or 
the erosion of pension benefits received by the workers, 
may trigger adverse labor market performance for 
economic growth (West, 1999). Besides, excessive fiscal 
spending on pension usually brings tax rates increase 
for financing public expenditures, but lowers savings 
and investment for economic growth. On the contrary, 
appropriate pension systems which facilitate increasing 
performance of employment and household saving, could 
promote exogenous growth by improving the operation of 
labor and capital as inputs into production (Myles, 2000). 
1.2  Principles of Pension Design 
Pensions can be managed in different ways in terms of 
how pensions are financed and the relationship between 
contributions and benefits. The fundamental choice of 
pension system is between individual risk bearing and 
social risk pooling, in other words the defined contribution 
(DC) and defined benefits (DB). Under a DC pension plan, 
pension investment and benefits as well as longevity risk 
are individual bearing. While under a DB pension plan, 
the society shares the risks as a whole. By definition, 
the DC plan is a fully-funded system. The DB plan can 
be further divided into unfunded pension scheme which 
is called Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) (Nicholas & Diamond, 
2006). 
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In a funded pension scheme, pensions are distributed 
out of a fund accumulated during the period of working 
time from the retired person’s contributions, which 
means there is no redistribution across generations. 
When an individual retires, the pension fund which both 
the enterprise and individual pool into will be holding 
the retired person’s past contributions, together with the 
returns and interests earned from investments on financial 
assets (Barr & Diamond, 2006). 
1.3  Economics of PAYG and Funded Pension 
System 
China formulated and continued the PAYG pension 
system in State-owned large enterprises in urban areas 
until the market reform in late 1980s. Contrast to the 
funded pension scheme, PAYG system is not financed 
by capital fund accumulated during their working days, 
but directly from the contributions of current workers. 
From the perspective of National Account, PAYG is a 
tax-transfer mechanism whereby income, as part of the 
social product, is transferred from current income-earners 
and redistributed to the older section of the population 
(Cesaratto, 2005). Since Bismark initiated the first formal 
pension system in Germany in 19th century, many policy 
makers have adopted the PAYG system because doing so 
permits a windfall benefit to current retirees at the cost 
of deferring the windfall of future taxpayers (Feldstein, 
1999). 
Samuelson’s (1958) famous article, “An Exact 
Consumption-loan Model of Interest With or Without the 
Social Contrivance of Money”, established the academic 
foundation that PAYG pension system is a desirable 
policy compared to funded system. From his analysis it 
can be inferred that in equilibrium, an unfunded PAYG 
pension system has a positive real rate of return which 
means the sum of the growth rate in the labor force and 
the growth rate of productivity (Feldstein, 1999). This can 
be illustrated in the following scenario: 
Person A contributes £1 to a pension system which 
established under the PAYG principle at time 0. If the rate 
of growth of aggregate wages is W=L+P (L is the growth 
grate of labor force, P is the growth rate of productivity 
which equals the growth rate of wages per worker), 
therefore after n years, Person A will receive the total 
amount of £(1+L+P)n . 
Samuelson’s theoretical analysis shows that in 
principle, PAYG pension system is a preferable policy 
choice for every generation to receive more than 
contribution payment, given that technology advancement, 
population growth and capital accumulation contribute 
to the growth rate of total real earnings overtakes the 
interest rate (Breyer, 1989; Aaron & Reischauer, 1998). 
However, it is worth noting that Samuelson’s pension 
theory is based on two fundamental assumptions: a) there 
is no capital stock in the economy; b) the ratio of the 
number of working population to retirees is balanced. 
First, countries normally have capital stock in reality. For 
these economies, marginal product of capital is higher 
than the growth rate of aggregate wages, therefore in 
practice the country could use a funded pension scheme 
to buy retirement income at a lower price than by the 
PAYG scheme (Feldstein, 1999). Second, population 
ageing is one significant demographic trend of modern 
society neglected by Samuelson. In a society where the 
fertility rate is low and longevity is increasing, the growth 
rate of labor force will slow down, which means fewer 
workers need to support more pensioners. Under this 
trend contribution rates will rise in order to maintain the 
current relation between retiree benefits and preretirement 
wages, or government cut benefits to maintain the fiscal 
sustainability. This could partially explain the shift from 
PAYG to funded systems in countries such as Chile (Barr, 
2002). 
1.4  The politics of Chinese Pension Reform 
The organization and management of the world most 
populous country with vast landscape is a challenging task 
from institutional perspective. The last imperial institution 
Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911, further intensified this 
governance challenge for the later capitalist Republic of 
China (1912-1949) and socialist People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) (1949- ). According to Beland and Yu (2004), 
after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) built the 
coherent bureaucratic state in 1949, the party’s intention 
to preserve its political domination posed a strong obstacle 
to systematically increase the administrative capacity 
of the state because the revolutionary CCP and the state 
institutions followed diverse organizational rational and 
logic. Therefore the administrative capacity building 
of the developmental state unavoidably challenged the 
political authority of the CCP, which could explain why 
the Party started the movements to destroy the building of 
state institutions, the most well-known one is the Cultural 
Revolution (Zheng, 1997). Even though state institutions 
were rebuilt afterwards, the continuing consensus building 
efforts resulted the administrative policy process in a 
way that is coherent with the institutionalist perspective 
(Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). 
Hence, with the large administration scope and the 
state-building issues, Chinese government encountered 
huge challenges to organize a centralized, national welfare 
state in China. Traditional political science suggested 
that for all states regardless of partisan compositions or 
national differences, labor is the center of welfare growth 
(Rudra, 2002). From a historical perspective, this also 
applied to the early stage of PRC. Chinese leaders were 
convinced of the importance of labor in securing political 
stability and economic development, therefore the 
government adopted a command approach of guaranteed 
employment or full employment policy (Iron rice bowl) 
in state-owned enterprises in urban areas. Employees 
in SOEs and other public sectors were eligible for the 
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pension protection. 
However, as the economic reform in SOEs proceeded, 
along with the marketization and economic liberalization 
in China since 1980s, rapidly rising unemployment in 
SOEs and rising employment in private sectors, which 
were inevitable process during the transition from a 
planned to a market economy, created powerful appeals 
for pension protection and objection on the state’s 
continuing pure PAYG pension scheme with limited 
coverage. 
2.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Quantitative data in this thesis are mainly collected 
from two channels: 1) Chinese official data yearbooks 
and 2) reports from international organizations and 
research centers. As for the first channel, relevant data 
is collected and organized consecutive years of China 
Statistical Yearbook, China Labor Statistical Yearbook, 
China Labor and Social Security Yearbook provided 
by China Statistical Bureau since 1951 (with some 
interruptions during Cultural Revolution). The raw data 
is transferred into different types to figures and some 
with simple calculations to support the analysis. Besides 
the first channel, demographic data also comes from 
United Nation’s Population Database, the World Bank 
Group and China Health and Retirement Longitudinal 
Study (CHARLS) database. Qualitative data in this thesis 
comes from secondary academic literatures and historical 
reviews. 
This thesis aims at analyzing factors that drive the 
reforms of pension system in China, therefor the Drivers 
of Change (DOC) analyzing framework developed by 
Oxford Policy Management for exploring the interactions 
between economic, political and social changes is adopted 
(Holland, 2007). The research scope is focused on China-
specific context in the era of opening up. China is a good 
case to analyze to what extent economic transitions along 
with demographic changes can explain the government 
reforms on pension system for two reasons: 1) China 
since 1950s has experienced two eras of distinct economic 
regimes. 2) As the most populous country, China has been 
experiencing diverse demographic changes including 
dramatic population growth, rural-urban migration and 
population ageing. 
3.  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Discussion and analysis on China’s pension reforms in 
the era of opening up will be conducted in a chronological 
sequence: 1951-1984, 1984-2000, and 2000-2010. The 
first part of this chapter will provide a historical review on 
economic transition and demographic changes. Reforms 
of pension systems that have taken place during each 
period will be discussed combined with specific economic 
and demographic changes. Then an assessment will be 
conducted to evaluate whether pension reform in China’s 
economy transition conformed to the forces that underlie 
economic activity and social circumstances particularly 
demographic changes. 
3.1  Historical Review on Economic Transition 
and Demographic Change in China
3.1.1  Review on Economic Transition
Figure 1 compares the economic history of China and 
Western Europe from 1500 till 2000 based on Madison’s 
estimates and available data (2007). Before 20th century, 
China’s per capita GDP stagnated at much lower level 
than Europe, and some historians attributed to the 
bureaucratic political-institutional systems in Ming (1368-
1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasty (Zhu, 2012). Since 
1950, one year after the establishment of PRC, there was 
a dramatic increase in China’s economy, but economic 
performance before and after 1978 differs significantly. 
Prior to the economic reforms in 1978, China was on 
the socialist path under the leadership of Chairman Mao 
Zedong, maintained the planned economy model, which 
is characterized by centrally controlled, inefficient, and 
relatively isolated from global economy (Morrison, 
2014). The People’s Republic imitated Soviet model 
in order to achieve its socialist transformation from an 
underdeveloped agricultural country to a developed 
industrialized country. Chinese Communist Party launched 
the Great Leap Forward movement for the big push 
towards industrialization, but resulted to 20-49 million 
people death due to starvation during 1959-1962 famine 
(Wright, 2011). In 1960s and 1970s, a series of social 
and political movements were carried out to strengthen 
the party’s control and promote the development of 
capital-intensive heavy industries through State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). 
According to Chinese government statistics, China’s 
real GDP grew at 6.7% from 1953 to 1978 (Figure 2), but 
many specialists have been questioned the accuracy of the 
data since China at that time was trapped into the so-called 
“a wind of embellishment and falsification” so the real 
production level was often exaggerated (Rawski, 2001). 
The industrialization process during this period created 
the misallocation of resources in industries and resulted 
the inefficiency, overflowing of redundant workers and the 
over production of no-market output in most SOEs (Zhu, 
2012). 
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Figure 1
Per capita GDP of China and Western Europe (1500-2000). 
Source: Madison (2007).
Figure 2
Chinese Per Capita GDP: 1950-1978 ($billion, PPP basis). 
Source: Historical Statistics of World Economy: 1-2008AD. 
In the late 1970s, China initiated a full-scale economic 
reform with a combination of regulation by plans and 
regulation by the market. Since then, China has been 
one of the fastest growing economies and created the 
experience of “China miracle” for other developing 
nations undergoing similar economic transition. According 
to the World Economic Outlook by the International 
Monetary Fund, China’s annual real GDP in 1980-90 and 
1990-99 averaged around 10.1% and 10.7% respectively, 
which implies that Chinese economy would double in size 
roughly every seven years (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3
Chinese Real GDP Growth: 1979-2014 (percent)
Source: World Economic Outlook 2014. 
China at first introduced household responsibility 
system in rural areas and abolished the people’s communes 
system in late 1970s. In urban areas, the decentralization 
of SOEs and the opening up to outside world eliminated 
the rigid structure of the planned economy, gave space to 
the development of non-collectively-owned enterprises, 
which in together dramatically altered the structure of 
Chinese economy (Wu, 2011). Rather than a wholly 
controlled price system during the pre-reform era, 
the government recovered the price mechanism and 
partially liberalized the role of market in production and 
consumption. In special economic zones and later in 
more broad areas, the government also adopted an open-
door policy to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
liberalize foreign trade (Lin et al., 2003). Till the end of 
1990s, Chinese economy has been transformed from an 
underdeveloped economy under state control into a fast-
growing economy where market played a major role. 
3.1.2  Review on Demographic Changes in China 
Demographers define demographic transition as a set of 
changes in reproductive behavior that societies experience 
the transformation from a pre-modern period with high 
fertility and high mortality to a post-modern one with 
low fertility and low mortality (Coale, 1984; Kirk, 1996). 
According to the Dyson (2010), demographic transition 
is categorized into three stages, characterized (1) higher 
birth rate, higher mortality and low natural growth rate 
of population; (2) high birth rate, low mortality and high 
natural growth rate; (3) low birth rate, low mortality 
and low natural growth rate of population. However, the 
classical demographic transition theories were developed 
from Western European countries’ experiences, therefore 
when the theory is applied to developing countries with 
diverse socioeconomic conditions, the reduction of 
fertility and mortality from high to low levels happened 
over shorter lengths of time. Despite the transition 
processes are different, there is a convergence of 
demographic transition theory that the world population 
will eventually reach the level of low fertility, low 
mortality and low population growth, known as the 
completion of demographic transition. 
Mortality Decline
With the return to a peacefully domestic environment, 
China entered the period of demographic transition since 
1950s. When People’s Republic of China was initially 
established, China was a typical pre-transition state with 
high fertility and mortality. In 1950 the crude birth rate, 
crude death rate and natural growth rate were 37‰, 20‰, 
and 17‰ respectively. From 1950, the crude death rate 
continuously declined except during the three years’ Great 
Famine from 1959 to 1961, and reached a low level of 
below 7‰ with small fluctuations ever since (Figure 4). 
Fertility Decline
Figure 4 shows that fertility decline occurred around 15 
years after mortality decline, but achieved a low level 
within a short period of around 20 years. From 1970s, 
the crude birth rate declined dramatically from around 
33‰ in early 1970s to 18‰ in late 1970s. Demographers 
attributed the transition in fertility to the family planning 
programmes introduced in the early 1970s in China. Since 
then almost all researches on Chinese population indicate 
a below replacement level of fertility (2 ‰). 
Although China is still the most populous state in the 
world, it’s population has been fundamentally changed 
over the past six decades. Today China’s fertility rate is 
among the lowest in developing world, and its structure has 
also changed considerably. Along with dramatic economic 
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changes, different demographic changes including the 
rapid population ageing and massive migration of floating 
people have brought huge influence on the labor market 
and implications for reforms of social policies.
Figure 4
Birth and Death Rate in China: 1949-2003 (per 1,000 people). 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2004). 
Population Growth 
The second stage of the demographic transition created a 
rapid increase of the population size. During the interval 
between mortality decline and fertility decline, the natural 
growth of population, which equals the difference between 
fertility rate and mortality rate, rises at the fastest rate. As 
we can see from Figure 5, the growth rate maintained high 
during 1960s and 1970s. Till year 1990, the population 
of China reached around 1 billion, which is regarded 
much lower than actual number due to the poor statistical 
research in rural areas.
Year Population Growth Rate (%) Total Population (million)
1960 1.83 667.07
1970 2.76 818.32
1980 1.25 981.24
1990 1.47 1135.2
2000 0.76 1262.6
2010 0.48 1.337.7
Figure 5
Population Growth 1960-2010. 
Source: World Bank (2015). 
Population Ageing
Population ageing, the process that brings rising 
proportions of older persons, has become a huge social 
problem for most developed countries especially in 
Europe since the mid-twentieth century. The mortality and 
fertility decline along with the prolonged life expectancy 
leads to population ageing in almost everywhere just like 
demographic transition at different level and speed (UN, 
2013). Population has been ageing for several decades 
in developed areas, while in developing countries, 
population ageing is a relatively recent phenomenon but 
at a fast speed. China is one of the fastest ageing countries 
in the world. In the end of 2012, the proportion of the 
people over 60 in China was 14.3%, higher than the world 
average (11%) and is predicated to rise to 34% in 2050 
(UN, 2015). 
3.2  China’s Pre-reform Pension System Under 
Planned Economy: 1951-1984
Economic Background
Prior to 1979 the economic reform and opening up, 
China maintained a centrally planned economy. With 
the damaged economic foundation and the necessity to 
build up national power and national security, Chinese 
government set out to develop heavy industries through 
direct government control. A series of Five-Year Plans 
were introduced as the strategies to prioritize the 
boom of heavy industries through direct control and 
command system. Under such planned economic system, 
government determined prices of all goods and assigned 
agricultural products low while industrial products high in 
order to generate surplus for nationalized enterprises and 
strengthen fiscal capability for industrialization. Studies 
of Chinese economic history in the socialist era found 
commonalities with USSR’s path of industrialization 
(Hay et al., 1994). The strategy of giving overwhelming 
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priority to heavy industry sectors was copied the model 
of Soviet Union under Stalin, who was a strong supporter 
of planned economy. The famous historian of modern 
China Maurice Meisner in his book Mao’s China and 
After (1977) regarded Mao’s era as China’s modern 
industrial era, and the huge investment in heavy industries 
and military industries promoted the dramatic increase 
in GDP than in other sectors. Rapid industrialization 
was achieved through high rates of investment and 
labor force participation, with squeezing agriculture 
and light industry. During the period of Great Leap 
Forward campaign (1958-1962), which aimed at speedily 
transforming China into socialist society through big push 
in industrialization and overwhelming collectivization, 
an estimated 60% decline in agricultural output and the 
greatest famine in 20th century dramatically hammered 
Chinese young economy. 
To support the rapid industrialization, Chinese 
government started the large-scale investment in 
heavy industries in early 1950s and established many 
centrally controlled, state-owned enterprises. In China, 
SOEs embrace the monopoly power in key industries, 
an economic characteristic that can be traced back to 
the planned economic era. Planners or officers had the 
absolute power in setting production targets, assigning 
consumption quotas, and allocating resources among 
different industries. Besides, in urban areas, private 
enterprises that once welcomed and encouraged to 
develop independently before the series movement in 
1953 were nationalized into socialized enterprises with 
state ownership. 
Pension System Under “Iron Rice Bowl” 
Chinese leaders clearly recognized that without abundant 
capital or modern technology, labor was a decisive factor 
for industrializing China. Even before the establishment 
of People’s Republic of China (PRC), social security 
system was put into agenda. Chinese workers had a 
relatively high social status for a long time especially 
during Mao era. In the Article 1 of Chinese Constitution, 
PRC is “a people’s democratic state led by the working 
class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants” 
(Wang, 1999). The economic and ideological priority 
of workers in China was reflected in the Labor Union 
Law, one of the first pieces of government legislation, 
which provides specific rights and social prestige for 
the workers. In the days of China’s centrally planned 
economy, government introduced programmes that mainly 
focused on the welfare of employees in large-sized SOEs 
(above 100 employees) and government organisations in 
rural areas, where people enjoyed the “cradle-to-grave” 
social protection (Saunders & Shang, 2001). Therefore 
SOEs under the planned economy were described as 
“micro welfare states” in which people were guaranteed 
lifetime employment along with social benefits including 
old age pensions, medical insurance and housing, which is 
described as “iron rice bowl” (Jackson et al., 2009). 
In 1951, the initial pension system in PRC was 
introduced under National Labor Insurance Regulation, 
the first formal pension system of China implemented 
by the State Council, which aims to promote the 
transformation of abundant labor force into the fuel of 
rapid economic growth. Retired employees in SOEs 
could receive 50% to 70% of their salaries at work as 
pension benefit. Backed up by the government, this 
system was based on the PAYG principle, unfunded with 
defined benefit, where enterprises paid 3% of their salary 
expenditures on funding the pension, of which 70% was 
paid as pension benefit to the retired employees directly 
and the rest 30% was used to finance the social pension 
pool as a form of pre-funding. With the improvement of 
the economic situation and political stability, Chinese 
government gradually expanded the coverage of old-
age pension. In 1958 the Temporary Regulations on 
Retirement of Workers included both governmental 
officials and industrial workers who came from enterprises 
with lower than 100 employees. 
The period of pension stagnation started with 
the outbreak of “Cultural Revolution” (1966-1976). 
Fully concentrated on the battle for “pure communist 
ideology”, the country stopped pooling pension funds, 
abolished organizations including All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and the Ministry of Labor, 
and transferred all accumulated fund of pension to other 
usages (Holzmann, 2000). Pension management was 
shifted to individual SOEs which were responsible for 
paying the pension for their employees from income 
account. However, the pension scheme was not re-
constructed even after the Cultural Revolution ended and 
enterprises continued to be solely responsible for pension 
provision. 
Challenges and Responses of Pension System in 
the Late 1970s 
The first three decades of PRC witnessed a rapid 
population growth due to the sharp mortality decline with 
an averaged high fertility (See 4.1.2). Between 1952-
1978, the total labor force grew from 207 million to 398 
million. However, under the economic system during this 
period, employment creation was relatively slow because 
most industries were capital-intensive while services and 
consumption industries were squeezed and neglected. 
Therefore even confronted the booming labor force, 
modern industries and service sectors could only absorbed 
37% of working population increase. Combined with only 
2% growth in agricultural workforce during this period, 
huge employment pressure was exerted to SOEs (Lee, 
2009). This situation got worse at the end of 1970s. When 
Cultural Revolution ended, tens of millions of young 
people forced in the Up to the Mountains and Down to the 
Countryside Movement1 returned to hometowns. While the 
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enterprise-based pension system was increasingly unable 
to meet present obligations, social stability was seriously 
threatened by widespread unemployment. 
Under such economic and social circumstances, the 
State Council amended the pension regulations in 1978, 
allowing pensions to be paid for people who worked 
continuously for 10 years rather than previous minimum 
20 years and increasing pension rates (Salditt et al., 2007). 
The new pension regulations towards a higher benefit and 
easier eligibility were clearly designed to encourage early 
retirement in order to accommodate the flow of work force 
supply. The qualifying years of total employment dropped 
from 25 for men and 20 for women to only 10 years for 
both men and women (Figure 6). As a result, the number 
of pensioners nearly doubled in the year after the 1978 
regulations with a large increase in pension expenditure, 
which motivated further reform in the next period.
Figure 6
Comparison of Retirement Age, Eligibility and Replacement Rates: 1951-1978. 
Source: Yearbook of Labor Statistics China (various years).
3.3  Pension Reforms Under Economic and 
Demographic Transitions: 1984-20001
The economic and social background of Chinese pension 
system in this period changed markedly and imposed great 
pressures for pension reforms. Deng Xiaoping’s Asian 
tour from 5th to 14th November especially to Singapore 
provided the most powerful message that market economy 
can perform better (To, 1981). Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s 
first prime minister and one of the most influential 
politicians in Asia, shared Singapore’s modernization 
experience with Deng Xiaoping. Not long after Deng’s 
Asian tour, China started the market-oriented economic 
reform and launched several waves of institutional and 
economic changes since 1978 (Béland & Yu, 2004). The 
coherent packages of the reform covered from agricultural 
policies of adopting the household responsibility system 
to marginal liberalization of markets to attract foreign 
investment. 
3.3.1  Economic Changes
SOEs’ Financial Pressures on Pension Provisions
1 The Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement 
(in Chinese shang shan xia xiang) during the Cultural Revolution, 
which was designed to prevent bourgeois thinking, forced tens of 
millions of fresh high school graduates out of cities and resettle in 
countryside.
As mentioned above, under the planned economy, 
a typical  enterprise in China was controlled by 
administrative agencies both in central ministries and in 
various levels of local government, and it was the state 
rather than the SOEs that bared the profits and losses, in 
which the pension expenditures was part of the production 
cost (Saunders & Shang, 2001). The market reform 
changed the relations between enterprises and the state. 
Since 1984, the Chinese government took serious steps 
to reform state enterprises and give them some autonomy 
in production, marketing and investment decisions. With 
a series of fiscal reforms that effectively transferred the 
residual claim to enterprise earnings to municipal level 
governments, the property rights of previous SOEs were 
transferred to local governments (Zhu, 2012). Besides, 
instead of handing in all earnings to the state, the SOEs 
were allowed to keep the remaining benefit within the 
enterprises after paying the required taxes to the state 
(Chow, 2004). 
However, the marketization process, which refers 
to the conversion from a planned economy with state 
intervention to a market economy where competition 
and self-regulation are promoted, negatively affected 
the financial situation of Chinese SOEs and therefore 
weakened their capacity to pay their retirees the promised 
full pension benefits. Confronting the competition from 
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both the emerging private sector enterprises as well as 
international competition from the opening up policy, 
SOEs for a long time relied on the monopoly power 
and state support cannot effectively integrated in the 
market competition, and therefore suffered terrible loss. 
According to Smyth (2000), the proportion of SOEs that 
ran deficits in industrial sectors jumped from 19.2% to 
38.2% during the period 1980-1997. In Figure 7 we can 
also find that especially in 1990s, there was a large amount 
of losses in State-owned industrial enterprises. Besides, 
without a clear pension reserves, SOEs had no choice but 
followed the pre-1980 high replacement rate, which was 
around 80% of current average salaries. Hence with poor 
performance after the economic reform, Chinese SOEs 
faced huge financial pressure on the pension responsibility 
under the traditional PAYG system. 
Figure 7
Stated-owned Industrial Enterprises Running a Deficit 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1998). 
Figure 8
Pensioners by Ownership Type and Ratio of Workers to Pensioners: 1978-1995
Source: China Statistical Bureau (1996). 
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Declining Workers-To-Retirees Ratio 
When Chinese pension first established in 1951, the official 
retirement age is 50 for women and 60 for men with the 
minimum 20 years registration. Therefore the issue of 
pension had not raised public concern until late 1970s 
when the qualified retirees started to reach their retirement 
age. The ease of pension eligibility to free up jobs for 
the young through early retirement further gave rise to a 
rapid increase in the number of pensioners, doubled from 
1978 to 1980 and doubled again in 1986 (See Figure 8). 
Confronting intense competition from marketization and 
dependency from the state as mentioned above, SOEs 
could only provided limited employment with averaged 
3% annual growth, which contributed to the progressively 
decline of workers-to-pensioners ratio (West, 1999).
The Shrinking Coverage of Pension
Till the early 1990s, the pension reforms undertaken by 
the government primarily focused on urban especially 
state enterprise workers, leaving a large number of 
workers in private sectors and rural people outside 
pension protection. Since the mid-1990s with the 
deepening reform towards a market-oriented economy, 
the changing structure of Chinese economy especially the 
downsizing of SOEs and the rapid development of private 
and informal sectors highlighted the problem of shrinking 
coverage of pension. 
The first factor contributed to the shrinking coverage 
is the downsizing of state-sector employment. In 
July 1992, the government announced Regulation on 
Transforming the Operational Mechanism of State-owned 
Industrial Enterprises which allowed inefficient and poor-
performing enterprises to modify their structure or to be 
sold to public or the employees. The 15th Party Congress 
held in September 1997 made a major breakthrough 
on ownership issues of SOEs. State ownership was 
downgraded to a “pillar of the economy” and private 
ownership was elevated to an “important component of 
the economy”, officially changed the almost 50 years 
privileged state monopoly of SOEs. Local authorities 
were given more space in restructuring state enterprises, 
and diverse patterns such as bankruptcy, auctions, mergers 
or acquisitions were adopted (Naughton, 2006). 
Along with the downsizing of SOEs, the official 
number of laid off workers increased from 3 million in 
1993 to 17.24 million in 1998 (Chinese Labor Statistics, 
1999). However, the real number of the laid-off workers 
during this period seems to be a mystery. According to 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security report 1999, the 
official number of redundant workers from SOE systems 
was 6.1 million at the end of 1998, which was considered 
much lower than the real number. Some scholars 
estimated that around 10-15 million SOE employees were 
laid off for this time range (Gu, 1999; Also see Figure 9). 
Both the downsizing of SOEs and layoffs contributed to 
the shrinking of pension coverage in public sectors. 
Figure 9
SOE Workers
Source: Naughton (2006). 
The second factor contributed to the shrinking 
protection of pension system was the increased 
employment in non-state sectors. Till the first several 
years of economic reform, almost all urban workers 
were formal employees in SOEs. The economic reform 
loosened the entrance of private enterprises and self-
employed business into market since 1980s, and changed 
supplementary role of private economy to an important 
component of the socialist market economy (Qian, 2000). 
Demand for labor in private sectors increased enormously 
due to the strong economic growth, and from Figure 10 
we can see the increase in urban private enterprises and 
individual employment. However, the pension coverage 
was limited primarily to employees of government and 
party organisations, SOEs, and large urban collectives, 
which excludes workers in private sectors. Therefore 
the pension coverage shrunk with self-employment and 
employment in private enterprises grew.
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Figure 10
Number of Employees by Sectors
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1996.
3.3.2  Demographic Changes 
Pension Pressure From Changing Demographic 
Structure 
Over the past several decades, the continuous fertility 
decline and longevity increase together give rise to 
population ageing. According to the data from United 
Nations Population Division, China’s total fertility 
declined from six children per women in 1950-1955 to 
fewer than two children per women in 1990-1995 (UN, 
2009). The rapid decline especially between 1970 and 
1980 could attribute to Chinese “later-longer-fewer” 
campaign which means delayed marriage, enlarging 
the interval between births and fewer children, as the 
guidance of family planning to slow population growth 
in 1971 (Conly & Camp, 1992). And later in 1979, the 
most influential one-child policy was announced in China 
led to continuous decline of fertility. The proportion of 
dependent working age population increased while the 
proportion of children decreased generated a favorable 
demographic condition for Chinese economic growth 
since the late 1970s, which could partially explain the 
booming GDP growth (Jackson et al., 2009). Benefit 
from the improvement in nutrition and health care, the 
longevity of people gradually increase as show in the 
figure of people’s expectancy at birth (Figure 11). As a 
consequence, according to the estimates by Zhang et al. 
(2000), the ratio of pensioners to workers has increased 
from 16.4% in 1985 to 37.1% in 2000, and is projected to 
reach around 50% by 2020. 
Figure 11
Chinese Life Expectancy at Birth: 1950-2005
Source: UN (2007).
Pension Pressure From Rural-urban Migration 
Chinese internal migration from rural to urban areas also 
has important implications for pension system coverage. 
From Figure 12 we can see that between 1980 to 1990, a 
large amount of rural people moved to towns and cities 
at a relatively low urbanization rate. The rapid migration 
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could be explained by Arthur Lewis’s dual-sector 
model-agricultural and industrial sectors-of developing 
economies. He assumed the surplus labor in agricultural 
sector would be transferred into modern manufacturing 
sector without substantial increase of wages (Cai, 
2012). The enlarging urban-rural development status 
and the huge demand for labors in urban private sectors 
encouraged the migration of rural farmers, but meanwhile 
increased the number of pensioners who take part in the 
urban social security for pension income. 
Year Total population(10,000)
Urban population
(10,000)
Net migration growth in persons 
(10,000)
1980 98,705 19,139 487
1985 105,851 25,094 831
1990 114,333 30,191 345
Figure 12
Rural-urban Migration 1980-1990.
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2000. 
3.3.3  Critical Analysis on Chinese Pension Reform 
1980-2000
Aware of  the increasing pressure from pension 
provisions and the enlarging pension demand as well 
as the demographic change, the Chinese government 
implemented major reforms in pension system in this 
period with the underlying economic reform especially 
the restructuring of SOEs. 
Three Tier Pension System to Ease SOEs’ 
Financial Burden 
The State Council Document 77 of 1986 published 
provisional regulations on pension pooling, which 
required individual contributions (up to 3 percent of 
their wages) into the pension system, aimed at releasing 
the financial burden for SOEs on pension payment. 
Along with the employees’ contributions, enterprise also 
contributed 15% of payroll to the pension pool, which 
further established a more effective funding base. The 
pension pool worked in this mechanism: If the pension 
cost was higher than the contribution rate, then the pool 
would supply pension payment; While if the pension 
expenditure was less than the contribution rate, then the 
surplus would remit to the pool. The set of contribution 
pool from both employers’ and employees’ participation 
was the first step towards a multi-pillar pension system. 
Besides, this practice could be viewed as part of the 
government efforts on strengthening the commercial 
competitiveness of SOEs under economic reform. 
Reacting to the trend of marketization and privatization 
along with economic reform, in late 1980s the pooling 
system was extended through city or provincial level to 
private sector enterprises including private companies. 
foreign enterprises and joint stock companies (World 
Bank, 1997). 
Year 1991 was regarded as the milestone for China’s 
pension reform history because the prototype of three 
pillars pension system was formed. Under this model, 
an essential statutory pension tier was jointly shared by 
the state, the enterprises and pensioners themselves. The 
second pillar was financed by surplus from operations 
with supplemental pensions provided by the enterprises, 
and pillar 3 was funded by individuals on a voluntary 
base with either periodic payment or lump sum after 
retirement. Since pillar 2 and 3 were not mandatory but 
depended on the enterprises’ profitability and individuals’ 
willingness, in practice, no SOEs set up pillar 2 and only 
a few individuals participated pillar 3 at the early years of 
1990s. 
Broaden Coverage
The 1995 State Council Circular on Deepening the Reform 
the first time provided a guidance of a unified national 
pension system with two initiatives2 for provincial 
administration. However, rather than broadening pension 
coverage, the coexistence of the two initiatives created 
conflicting schemes at local level and resulted a further 
fragmentation of Chinese pension system, because local 
government attempted to differentiate the pension design 
from others to keep control on the pension funds (World 
Bank, 1997). In order to unify the fragmented pension 
system, the State Council approved Document No. 26 
Establishment of a Unified Basic Pension System for 
Enterprise Employees in 1997. This reform was under 
the influence of Word Bank’s suggestions on the initial 
formulation of the multi-pillar pension design, and 
aimed toward a system which covered all workers in 
both state and non-state sectors. The expanding coverage 
of pension from mainly SOEs employees to the entire 
urban workers including self-employed matched up the 
rapid development of private sector in economy and the 
emerging needs of pension protection. The 1997 reform 
symbolized the formal establishment of China’s Three-
pillar pension system which is adopted as the principle 
pension framework till now (Figure 13). 
2 Plan 1: Emphasize on individual account with 3% individual 
contribution of total wages. Plan 2: Emphasize on social pooling 
and local authorities decide on the contribution sharing between 
employees and employers. 
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Figure 13
Current Structure of China’s Pension System
Source: Salditt et al. (2007). 
Remaining Issues 
(1) Low overall coverage rate
Despite the government had made great efforts in 
broadening the pension coverage, the overall coverage 
ratio was quite low. As shown in the Figure 14, the 
coverage ratio in urban China gradually increased during 
1990s, but till the early 2000s, the coverage ratio was still 
below 40%, which means for every 10 working people 
in urban China, only 4 of them under the coverage of 
formal pension system. The overall coverage rate in both 
urban and rural areas is further lower. Figure 15 is the 
comparison of coverage between China and other eight 
developing countries. While the overall coverage rage 
of China in 2002 is 20.7, lower than half of the averaged 
rates of the other eight countries. More recent data shows 
that, in 2007, just 3 in 10 Chinese workers are covered by 
public pension system (Figure 16).
Figure 14
Urban Pension Statistics in China: 1989-2003.
Source: National Bureau Statistics (2004). UN population database (2004). 
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Figure 15
Comparison of Coverage Rates and GDP Per Capital 2002
Source: coverage rage from Claramunt (2004); GDP per capital from the World Bank Data.
Figure 16
Percent of Total Chinese Workforce Covered by Public Pension System in 2007 
Source: Jackson et al. (2009).
One reason that can partially explain the relatively low 
urban coverage rate is the lagging pension arraignment 
for rural-urban migrant workers. As mentioned above, the 
economic reform promoted the huge population floating 
towards prosperous cities in coastal China. But due to 
Chinese Hukou System which classified all Chinese into 
agricultural or non-agricultural residents, rural migrant 
workers are denied the access to pension protection. 
According to an empirical analysis on the issue of social 
insurance received by the migrants in Jiangsu Province, 
China, only 15% of total migrant workers were enrolled 
in the urban pension system (Nielsen et al., 2005). 
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(b) Few contributions to population ageing challenge. 
It is clear that the practice of the government on pension 
systems during this period was an effort to reduce the 
contribution burden on SOEs. The enlarging coverage 
of private sector workers brought working-age group in 
making contributions for several years before they could 
claim a pension benefit (Jackson et al., 2009). However, 
under the PAYG pension scheme which means a large 
proportion of the enterprises’ and workers’ contribution 
was used to pay for the pension responsibility of prior 
retirees, those workers in private sectors had little 
incentive to participate, which further resulted to 
government’s failure in expanding pension coverage. 
In order to meet the pension payments, the local social 
security bureaus on one hand increased the contribution 
rate, on the other hand diverted the contributions in 
individual account to cover the shortfall. The “empty” of 
individual account further cannot play its role in releasing 
the financial burden of population ageing and uncertain 
economic growth (World Bank, 1994). 
3.4  Pension Reform Under Economic and 
Demographic Pressures: 2000-2010
3.4.1  Economic Changes
From Investment and Export-led to Consumption-
led Growth Strategy
Since 2004, the fundamental alter of Chinese growth 
strategy was from investment and export-led development 
to a path that relied more on domestic consumption. 
Especially after the 2008 Financial Crisis which hit the 
momentum of China’s economic growth, the drop of 
GDP growth rate and industrial production rate after 2008 
further motivated the structural adjustment of Chinese 
economy (See Figure 17). Since the economic reform and 
opening up in late 1970s, Chinese economic growth was 
largely engine by huge investment, export accompanying 
the beneficial demographic dividend, and the GDP per 
capita markedly increased from $193.3 in 1980 to $4514.9 
in 2010 (World Bank, 2014). The rapid growth in income 
did not transfer into consumption mainly because the high 
savings of Chinese household. 
Figure 17
China: GDP and Industrial Production Growth.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics. 
China has a high savings rate and the gross savings 
reached more than 50% of total GDP in 2010, much higher 
than the 22.4% world average level (World Bank, 2014). 
Except for cultural reasons, the lack of a well-developed 
social protection system is a major factor discouraging 
future consumption (Cai, 2012). Chinese people are not 
clearly aware how much benefits they can expect to get 
from pension system, confronting the overwhelming 
population ageing pressure and its influence on the 
soaring ratio of beneficiaries to workers, therefore people 
especially approaching retirement age choose to save more 
and consume less to secure occasional expenditures. In 
order to sustain economic growth in China, the provision 
of adequate and reliable pension system is indispensable 
for encouraging consumption and boosting output through 
a reduction of precautionary savings. 
Pension deficit and unsustainable finance 
The transition from purely PAYG pension system built 
in socialist China to the multi-pillar pension system after 
1997 faced the question of what to do with the previous 
pensioners and transitional workers while implementing 
the new system. Document 26 divided the pensioners into 
three groups:
Group 1. Retirees that left the job position before 1997 
maintained the original PAYG system. 
Group 2. For those who entered the labor market in or 
after 1997 would be applicable to the three-pillar pension 
system. 
Group 3. For those who had worked for several 
years but would retire after 1997 would be under the 
arrangement of transitional plan. 
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The transition cost mainly came from the basic 
pension provision for Group 1 and the input to establish 
individual account. The transition problem was obvious: 
no contribution that had been accumulated for the 
pension benefit for the older workers before the reform. 
Critics argue that transition from a PAYG system to a 
different system would require current employees to “pay 
double”, which means during the transition period, the 
combination of the contribution required to pay retirees in 
Group 1 and the savings required to fund future benefits 
would be 40% (Frazier, 2004). In theory, as new retirees 
draw on their funded individual accounts as a source of 
retirement income, the contribution rate would gradually 
decline over time during a transition. However, the large 
unfunded liability of old pension system as well as the 
low contribution rate could not meet the legacy obligation. 
Therefore at the provincial level, revenues that should 
be pooled into the individual account (pillar 2) had to 
transferred to basic pension payment (pillar 1), which 
made the individual account empty or notional. For one 
thing, the underdevelopment of individual account created 
pressures for the satiability of Chinese pension system. 
For the other, central government subsidized individual 
account heavily, from more than ten billion RMB in 1998 
to nearly 40 billion in 2000, which exert financial pressure 
on government budget (MOLSS, 2001). 
3.4.2  Demographic Pressures
According to the UN projections for 2050, the age 
group of above 60 years will arrive 34% of all Chinese 
population (UN, 2013). As the life expectancy rate 
continues to rise, the old age dependency ratio-the number 
of population aged 65 and over divided by the 15-64 
working age group-gradually increase and is estimated 
to reach around 40% on 2050 (See Figure 18). The 
accelerating population aging and the rising responsibility 
on supporting the old-age group impose much more 
pressure on pension system. 
Figure 18
Dependency Ratio of China.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2006.
3.4.3  Critical Analysis of CHINESE PENSION 
Reform 2000-2010
Achievement---National Social Security Fund
Concerned about the pension deficit at the provincial level 
especially from the transition cost and the accelerating 
population ageing, the state created the National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) as a reserve fund in 2000 under the 
supervision and management of National Council (Leckie, 
2011). 
According to the regulation, there are mainly four 
sources of the assets: fiscal transfers from central 
government budget, capital and equity asset transfers from 
SOEs share sales, national lottery income and investment 
returns. As can be seen from Figure 19, the total assets 
markedly increased from $2.4 billion at the establishment 
to around $120 billion at the end of 2000. The fund invests 
in both equity and bond and other assets in domestic 
and international markets, and has generated around $36 
billion profit by 2009. The establishment and operation 
of NSSF strategically serves the long-term pension fund 
to cover the transition cost and the sustainability of the 
multi-pillar system. Some professionals call for more 
rigid rules should be set on NSSF in terms of the portfolio 
limits and restrictions on secondary markets to reduce 
risks (Ma & Zhai, 2001). 
Remaining Issues
(a) Lagging Rural Pension
Progress in rural pension reform has been very limited 
compared to ongoing reform of SOEs in urban areas. 
Due to household registration system, more than half 
of the Chinese population lives in rural areas. Although 
in 1991 the State Council decided to develop old-age 
social insurance system in rural areas and the next year 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs adopted the system as the 
basic operational level, the coverage was very limited. 
According to a survey on China’s urban and rural elderly 
in 2000, only about 7% of old-age people received 
pension benefits or old age insurance, whereas 85% still 
relied on family support (Hu, 2006). In 1998 the old-age 
social insurance was replaced by a commercial insurance 
programme, which further led to the decline in coverage 
from 75 million in 1997 to 54 million in 2004. 
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Figure 19
Total Assets of the National Social Security Fund
Source: NSSF. http://www.ssf.gov.cn/
Underlying the limited coverage of rural pension is 
the enlarging inequality between urban and rural incomes, 
which further imposed huge financial pressure on the 
security of rural elderly. Chinese economic reforms 
have not substituted the powerful command economy 
with a dependent market economy. Instead, traditional 
agriculture and modern industry, formal sector and 
informal sectors coexisted in the dual tracks (Fang, 2014). 
The enlarging income gap between rural and urban areas 
is notable. According to data from National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, urban workers could earn 3.3 times as 
much as farmers in rural areas, which partly explain the 
situation that poverty among elderly group in rural areas is 
much more greater than in urban areas. Based on 17,708 
interviews on people over 45 years across 28 provinces, 
the research conducted by China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study found that nearly 25% of elderly 
people in China live below the poverty line (CHARLS, 
2013). Without a reliable income to secure basic living, 
the majority of the elderly continue to work at age 65-69, 
and more than 20% work even after age 80. 
(b) Administration 
In 2006 investigators disclosed that Shanghai Social 
Security invested a large part of its fund in a highly 
speculative projects and the leading official group 
of Shanghai was proved personal benefit from this 
investment (Salditt et al., 2007).  This scandal started 
to raise public attention on the transparency and 
administration of pension system.
According to the framework since 1997 reform, 
central government and local government jointly share 
the administration responsibility of pension system. 
This decentralization, which refers to the distribution 
of decision power from central government to the local 
authorities in order to stimulate regional creativity and 
reform initiatives, started from the post-Mao era and 
more progressively in the economic reform such as the 
restructuring SOEs as mentioned above (Béland & Yu, 
2004). The provincial funding of pension system (pillar 
Ⅱ) contributes to the misuse of pension assets such 
as the Shanghai pension scandal. Under a relatively 
underdeveloped capital market, the lack of accurate 
information or disclosure of statistics on NSSF portfolio 
threatens the reliability and public confidence in the 
system, leading to disastrous consequences on the 
sustainability of pension system and China’s economic 
situation further. 
Above critical analysis on the pension reform policies 
under economic and demographic pressures in 1984-2000 
and 2000-2010 could demonstrate that Chinese pension 
systems in the era of economic reform and opening up 
are shaped by economic transition and demographic 
changes within these periods. However, the existence 
of remaining issues including the enlarging inequality 
between urban-rural areas and administrative problems, 
together indicated that the economic-demographic 
analysis cannot sufficiently explain the patterns of pension 
system change. Additional variable is required to provide 
a complementary explanation of why problems still 
remained in pension systems even after reforms. 
4 .   S U P P L E M E N T E D  P O L I T I C A L 
EXPLANATIONS 
In order to further explore pension reforms in transitioning 
China, additional variable from the political economics 
perspective will be added to supplement the economic-
demographic explanation. 
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4.1  Rural-Urban Inequality 
The long-term urban bias or discrimination against rural 
residents on pension protection derives from the heavy-
industry oriented development strategy in Mao’s era. 
Robert Bates (1981) states that the advantageous position 
of urban sector is because urban groups are politically 
powerful. However, the historical review of China’s 
economic transition in Chapter 4.1 suggests that the 
formation of the heavy-industrial strategy was not an 
outcome of political pressures from urban interest groups, 
but from the government’s desire to quickly catch up with 
the industrialized countries. Therefore the state institutions 
adopted interventions in output and factor markets to 
squeeze rural development for urban development, which 
could explain the urban-based reform pension system 
before 1984 (Yang & Li, 2003). 
In the era of opening up, despite CCP corrected the 
previous development strategy and relaxed political 
controls with the cancellation of People’s Communes, 
large urban-rural division in pension systems still existed 
even after the 1997 pension reforms. Institutions and 
policies inherited from the planned system had not 
been completely removed, for example the coercive 
intervention in labor markets, e.g. restrictions on labor 
mobility from rural to urban areas through household 
registration system, put great pressures on the urbanization 
of landless farmers and their old-age security. 
4.2  Weak Pension Regulation 
Except the lack of accurate information and a mature 
capital market, weak law enforcement and the regulator’s 
incompetence that derive from the bureaucratic political 
structure and the agent problem between central and local 
governments, contributed to the disappointed outcome 
of pension reform in recent years. Till now, there is no 
national social security law in force, nevertheless a special 
pension law (Li & Gao, 2005). The pension system is only 
regulated through a series of decision issued by the State 
Council and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. 
CONCLUSION
This thesis investigates China’s historical public pension 
reforms under the broad contexts of China’s economic 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-
oriented economy with a series of economic reforms 
started in late 1970s. It tries to address the question of 
whether Chinese government’s efforts on pension reforms 
conformed to the economic and demographic changes 
underlined the context of economic transition in three 
periods respectively: 1951-1984; 1984-2000; 2000-2010. 
The major findings and implications of each period are 
indicated below.  
First, China’s pension reforms from a purely PAYG 
based and SOEs backed system to the multi-tires system 
were motivated by emerging economic reforms and 
demographic changes. SOE’s financial burden on pension 
payment because of its loss of profit and declining 
workers-to-retirees ratio was eased by the introduction 
of this three-tier pension system in 1990s, therefore 
pension responsibility was jointly shared by enterprise, 
state and pensioners themselves. Besides, facing the 
shrinking coverage of pension because of the downsizing 
of SOEs and rapid labor force increase in urban areas, 
the government expanded the coverage from solely 
SOEs employees to the entire urban workers in order 
to broaden the pension coverage. During 2000-2010, 
the National Social Security Fund based on the three-
tire pension scheme was created to solve the pension 
deficit from transition cost and rapid population ageing. 
Hence the analysis on the three period pension reform 
could demonstrate that primary efforts of government 
on reforming pension system were motivated by the 
economic reforms and emerging demographic changes. 
Second, despite some amendments were introduced 
under evolving economic and demographic circumstances 
and had made some achievements, the pension reform 
is incomplete to solve all the challenges. Remaining 
issues including low public pension coverage rate, the 
insufficient measures to accelerate population ageing, 
and the lack of effective regulations and supervision on 
pension fund management. Within each period of pension 
reform, pension reform was incorporated in and served 
mainly for the economic development strategy, such as the 
industrialization in the first period, the SOE reform and 
marketization in the second period, but concerned less on 
demographic changes especially population ageing, and 
social issues generated from defective pension systems 
such as the imbalanced pension programmes between 
urban and rural areas. 
Finally, considering the large amount of current 
and future retirees in China and the widespread old-
age poverty in rural places, further researches need 
to be conducted on the directions of China’s pension 
reform. Since universal pensions have been successfully 
alleviating poverty in old age in both developed and 
developing countries such as New Zealand and Mauritius, 
the debate on whether China should approach a universal 
pension system is increasingly heated (Jackson et al., 
2009; Shen & Williamson, 2010). Undoubtedly the 
universal scheme could all old-aged be covered under the 
protection, whether the fiscal cost and transition cost can 
be manageable in transitioning economy needs further 
investigation. 
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